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1. Water sector in England 
The present system of provision of water and sewerage in England consists of nine large regional 
private water and sewerage companies, with a few smaller private water-only companies, which 
both own the entire assets of the system and are licensed monopolies of water and sewerage 
services in their areas. The water providers in Scotland and Northern Ireland remain in the public 
sector. In Wales, water is provided by a not-for-profit company. Three of the English companies are 
listed on the London Stock Exchange while six have been de-listed and are now owned privately.  
 
The problems of the English system are: 
 upward pressure on pricing due to payments of dividends and debt interest;  
 narrow regulation by OFWAT, with a system of price controls that fails to deal with all of the 
methods of value extraction by shareholders; 
 poor performance, for example, in terms of leakage and sewage-flooding, for which 
companies continue to be fined millions of pounds in 2016 and 2017; 3 
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 lack of accountability or public control, with complex corporate structures, a dense web of 
intercompany loans and opaque offshore ownerships in some cases;  
 rising inequality as many struggle to pay water bills which feed into dividend payments to 
some of the world’s richest. 4 
2. Finances and Investment 
The private sector paid very little for these companies at the time of privatisation in 1989. Investors 
paid £7.6bn for the shares, but the government took over all the debts of the sector (worth £4.9bn) 
and gave the new private corporations a ‘green dowry’ of £1.5bn, a combined injection of £6.4bn of 
public funds (Bayliss 2014). The companies were thus effectively debt-free at the time of 
privatisation. 
 
A Report by the National Audit Office (2015) puts capital investment since privatisation at £126bn. 
However, this has largely been financed by debt as Chart A shows.  The value of shareholder equity 
investment has hardly changed in the past twenty-five years, so the companies have financed 
investment by increasing borrowings rather than investing their own capital. Debts come at a cost. 
 
Chart A: Debt and equity in water sector 1990-2015 (NAO) 
 
 
 
Tables 1-3 review the finances of the nine regional English companies over the last 10 years. On 
average, the nine companies have paid nearly £1.5bn per year in net finance costs ((Table 2).  The 
cost of this debt is much higher than it would be for public sector bodies: the yield on government 
gilts is about 1.2%, whereas OFWAT assumes the private companies pay more than double this rate, 
so the difference is equivalent to more than £500m. per year on the combined net debt of £42bn 
(Table 3). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 https://www.ft.com/content/c461a8ae-4495-11e3-8926-00144feabdc0 ;  FT    04/05/2017 Thames Water: the 
murky structure of a utility company https://www.ft.com/content/5413ebf8-24f1-11e7-8691-d5f7e0cd0a16 
4 Hong Kong billionaire, Li Ka-shing who controls Northumbrian Water is ranked number 19 on Forbes list of 
the richest people in the world - https://www.forbes.com/billionaires/list/#version:static 
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While sector debt has been rising, shareholders have been extracting dividends. Table 1 provides 
summary data compiled from the water and sewerage companies’ Annual Reports over the past ten 
years. The Table shows that almost all of the post-tax profit of £18.8bn has been paid out in 
dividends (£18.1bn). Arguably these are funds that could have been used to finance physical 
investment or to reduce company debt (and thereby lower debt interest payments).  
 
Furthermore, three companies – Anglian, Severn Trent, and Yorkshire – have paid out more in 
dividends than their total pre-tax profits over the past ten years. This is not economically 
sustainable.  
 
 
Table 1: Regional water and sewerage companies finances 2007-2016: totals 
Company 
Pre-tax 
profit 
(£m) Tax (£m) 
Post tax 
profit (£m) 
Dividends 
(£m) 
Retained 
earnings 
(£m) 
Net 
finance 
costs 
Anglian Water 3,018.80 -11.80 3,007.00 3,708.90 -701.90 -1,388.40 
Northumbrian Water 2,173.40 -325.60 1,847.80 1,807.60 40.20 -1,132.70 
Severn Trent Water 2,434.10 -177.40 2,205.60 2,441.60 -236.00 -2,125.40 
South West Water 1,384.60 -194.90 1,189.70 1,013.90 175.80 -626.90 
Southern Water 1,359.80 -171.00 1,060.30 666.80 393.50 -1,629.00 
Thames Water 3,360.80 -195.30 3,165.50 2,531.30 634.20 -3,006.20 
United Utilities Group Plc 4,244.10 -438.80 3,805.30 2,663.10 1,142.20 -2,052.70 
Wessex Water 1,421.30 -231.80 1,189.50 1,117.50 72.00 -741.40 
Yorkshire Water 1,310.30 80.90 1,391.20 2,178.50 -787.30 -1,947.10 
Total  20,707.20 -1,665.70 18,861.90 18,129.20 732.70 -14,649.80 
Source: compiled from company annual reports 
 
Table 2: Regional water and sewerage companies finances 2007-2016: annual averages 
Company 
Pre-tax 
profit 
(£m) 
Tax 
(£m) 
Post tax 
profit (£m) Dividends 
Retained 
earnings 
(£m) 
Net interest 
payable and 
similar charges 
Anglian Water 301.88 -1.18 300.70 370.89 -70.19 -138.84 
Northumbrian Water 217.34 -32.56 184.78 180.76 4.02 -113.27 
Severn Trent Water 243.41 -17.74 220.56 244.16 -23.60 -212.54 
South West Water 138.46 -19.49 118.97 101.39 17.58 -62.69 
Southern Water 135.98 -17.10 106.03 66.68 39.35 -162.90 
Thames Water 336.08 -19.53 316.55 253.13 63.42 -300.62 
United Utilities Group Plc 424.41 -43.88 380.53 266.31 114.22 -205.27 
Wessex Water 142.13 -23.18 118.95 111.75 7.20 -74.14 
Yorkshire Water 131.03 8.09 139.12 217.85 -78.73 -194.71 
Annual total 2,070.72 -166.57 1,886.19 1,812.92 73.27 -1,464.98 
Source: compiled from company annual reports 
 
Table 3: Regional water and sewerage companies’ finances 2016 
Company Net debt Equity 
Gearing* 
(%) 
Highest paid 
director (£m) 
Anglian Water 6,539.2 3,014.1 79 1.20 
Northumbrian Water 2,690.8 667.0 67 0.71 
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Severn Trent Water 4,823.4 1,018.5 61 2.40 
South West Water 1,793.0 530.4 62 0.76 
Southern Water 4,626.5 1,359.8 78 0.70 
Thames Water 10,154.2 3,113.7 80 0.96 
United Utilities Group 
Plc 6,260.5 2,705.5 63 2.80 
Wessex Water 1,880.8 732.8 62 0.60 
Yorkshire Water 3,551.7 1,148.0 77 1.20 
Total / annual total 42,320.1 14,289.8  11.33 
Source: compiled from company annual reports with additional material from Ofwat5 
 
So, the cost of maintaining and improving the infrastructure for the last 28 years has not been 
financed by investors – it has been met by borrowing. With most of the profit, allocated to 
dividends, the companies have been borrowing ever-increasing amounts in order to pay for the 
actual physical investment. The companies which were debt-free at privatisation in 1989 have now 
accumulated over £40billion in debt (Table 3), which now finances over three-quarters of the 
companies’ assets.  
 
Four companies have now been taken over by consortia of financial investors, three of which are 
registered in Jersey, and these have all undertaken a complex securitisation exercise via a subsidiary 
set up in the Cayman Islands which allows them to hike up debt levels still further. Table 3 shows 
that these are the companies with the highest gearing ratios (Anglian, Southern, Thames and 
Yorkshire).  Thames Water in 2016 recorded net debt of over £10bn. In the securitised structures, 
the licensed water utility sits in a complex web of companies where dividend and interest payments 
flow to and from group companies so that the flow of funds is very difficult to track. Aside from the 
complexities of inter-company transfers, high debts have led to increased interest payments. 
 
Despite the profitability of the sector, water companies pay little tax.  In a ten-year review of 
company accounts, the combined tax charge in profit and loss accounts comes to £1.7bn on a pre-
tax profit of £20.7bn – around 8%. Actual tax paid can be much lower: in 2013 for example, the 
shareholders extracted nearly £1bn in dividends, but paid only £1m in taxes.6 
 
In 2016, water and sewerage companies paid out a total of £1.45bn in net interest payments and 
£1.482bn in dividends which is equivalent to over 28% of turnover. These costs are borne by 
consumers. Since privatisation in 1989, household bills have risen by 40% more than inflation (NAO 
2015). On average, over the past ten years, water and sewerage companies have paid over £1.8bn 
per year in dividends, which equates to about £75 per household per year. This is an expensive way 
to finance infrastructure. 
 
The regulator, OFWAT, has not proved a great obstacle to the companies, as noted by the House of 
Commons Public Accounts Committee, which stated in 2016 that: “Ofwat, like other economic 
regulators, has repeatedly overestimated the cost of finance in successive price reviews. … As a 
result, water companies made windfall gains of at least £1.2 billion between 2010 and 2015 from 
bills being higher than necessary”. Shareholders are likely to have made additional financial gains 
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6 Corporate Watch 2014 Energy, rail and water privatisation costs UK households £250 a year 
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outside the scope of the regulator, for example from shareholder loans at higher than market rates 
of interest, from the sale of land and property and from the sale of ownership stakes in the utility. 
However, the full amounts are difficult to determine, in part due to dense corporate structures, and 
to limited disclosure. Australian investors Macquarie, for example, sold their remaining 26% stake in 
Thames Water for an “undisclosed sum” earlier this year.7 
3. International comparisons 
 
The English system is unique in the world. Despite much study and publicity, no other country has 
adopted this model in the last 28 years. Even where water is privatised, this typically takes the form 
of a fixed term concession rather than the complete transfer of ownership as has happened in the 
English model. The great majority of countries provide water and sewerage services though 
municipalities or regional public authorities (as was the case in the UK before privatisation in 1989). 
Even in the USA, 85% of water is public, carried out by municipalities. And there has been a strong 
trend in Europe and elsewhere in the last decade to re-municipalisation of private water services, 
including the cities of Paris and Berlin. Such systems are subject to scrutiny by local people, in a way 
the private companies of England simply are not.  
 
There is considerable evidence to show that the efficiency of public systems is at least as high as that 
of private operators ( see e.g. http://www.psiru.org/reports/public-and-private-sector-
efficiency.html and Annex A), while the cost of financing the service is much lower, because 
governments can borrow money more cheaply.  
4. Public ownership and operation of water and sewerage services 
England could follow these global trends and restructure the service as a local, democratic, publicly 
owned system. The primary benefit would be to stop the extraction of dividends to 
shareholders (£1.8bn per year) and to reduce interest payments on debt (£500 million per 
year).  These combined savings of £2.3 billion per year equate to about £100 per year per 
household - equivalent to a cut in water bills of about 25%. 
 
Under public ownership, these savings can be used in a number of ways, with the choices 
subject to open public debate: reducing charges, financing investment, reducing debt, cross-
subsidising other public services, such as social care. 
 
A new public system could be based on the following elements: 
 New public bodies should be created for each of the water regions, to take over the system 
and operate water and sewerage services using the existing workforce.  
 The ownership of these bodies, and responsibility for water and sewerage services, should 
be vested in the local authorities in the region. The boards of the new bodies should thus 
have a majority of representatives from municipalities in the region, but also include 
representatives from local communities and employees, plus national government 
appointees.  
 Board meetings should be held monthly, in public, and all documents of the authorities 
should be open to public scrutiny. 
 Public ownership and openness should become requirements for any future provider of 
water and sewerage services.    
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 The functions of OFWAT should be brought back under democratic political control by 
returning them to the ministry, or an agency directly accountable to the minister, thus 
ending the present system whereby the regulator acts autonomously, without political 
accountability. This national agency will be responsible for both price regulation and for the 
standards required of water authorities (currently derived from EU legislation).  The national 
agency will be required to hold regular public consultation exercises in formulating its 
policies, and include representatives of the regional bodies, consumers, employees, and 
others.   
 The new regional water authorities will be required to form an association to conduct annual 
public peer review of operations and efficiency, following the Netherlands model of 
‘sunshine regulation’, a system which is at least as effective as, and much cheaper than, 
Ofwat (see Annex B). 
Such a system would provide a huge gain in democratic control over a vital service. Decisions would 
be made in public, based on discussion of public interest, and subject to transparent availability of 
information. But it would also have substantial economic benefits for consumers and government. 
 
The new public water utilities would acquire all the shareholder equity of the existing water 
companies. In the short term this means that the extraction of dividends from end users to 
shareholders would cease.  In the longer term the existing private debt would be refinanced by 
public sector bonds at lower interest rates, thereby lowering the cost for the utilities.  
5. Compensation 
Legislation to make these changes requires bringing the water companies into public ownership, 
which in turn raises the question of compensation. UK law confirmed as recently as 2012 that the 
rules of compensation for such transfers to public ownership are not determined by stock market 
prices, but decided by parliament, based on the public interest, after taking into account various 
factors (see Annex C). Market value is only one factor in the valuation process.  
 
Three companies are part of groups listed on the London stock exchange (Severn-Trent, United 
Utilities and Pennon), and so the market value of parent shares is known, and the proportion due to 
the water company can be estimated.  On this basis, the total current market value of the shares in 
the water companies could be about £37bn (Annex D). 
 
But Parliament will surely want to take into account other factors in negotiating compensation, 
including: the actual level of shareholder equity in the companies, or book value of the companies, 
which is only £14.3bn (Table 3) 8;   the substantial public subsidies given to the companies in 1989 
(worth £12bn at today’s prices); the failure of shareholders to invest new equity since 1989; the 
inflation of share prices by the extraction of dividends; the very low level of actual tax payments; and 
the use of subsidiaries in offshore tax havens like the Cayman Islands. Parliament may also want to 
address the remarkable feature of the companies’ current licenses as providers of water and 
sanitation services, which states that they can only be terminated after giving the firms 25 years 
notice.  
 
Thus, a wide range of figures is possible, depending on the outcome of these processes: for example, 
using book value, and adjusting for public subsidies, would point to a figure as low as £2.3bn; by 
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contrast the owners might hope for close to the market value of £37bn, without any account taken 
of the other factors. 
 
The compensation should be considered in terms of an investment by the state, in return for which 
the public sector gains economically and socially valuable assets. In this case, there would be a clear 
and substantial return on such an investment,  with annual savings of £2.3bn in interest and 
dividend payments. Even if the final figure was as high as £20bn, this would represent an investment 
with an annual return of over 11%.   
 
Discussion of compensation usually raises concerns about the impact on pension funds. However, 
pension funds own only 3% of shares of UK quoted companies. The majority of shares in quoted 
companies  (54%) are owned by foreign investors, with individuals, unit trusts, financial institutions 
(including banks and insurance companies), and other private companies holding 37%. The 
remainder are held by the public sector, trusts, and charities .  The percentages of foreign companies 
or private equity funds held by UK pension funds is likely to be even lower.  The concerns over the 
impact on pension funds could thus be dealt with by special provision for any impact on UK pension 
funds (ONS 2014).  
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7. Annexes 
A. Efficiency 
PSIRU 2014 Public and private sector efficiency http://www.psiru.org/reports/public-and-private-
sector-efficiency.html : see p. 21 
“It is often assumed that privatisation or PPPs will result in greater levels of technical efficiency. That 
is, the private sector can always deliver a given level of service with less input costs than the public 
sector. Politicians, media, academics and consultants frequently refer to ‘private sector 
efficiency’.  This assumption is often shared even by critics of privatisation. But there is now 
extensive experience of all forms of privatisation, and researchers have published many studies of 
the empirical evidence on comparative technical efficiency. The results are remarkably consistent 
across all sectors and all forms of privatisation and outsourcing: there is no empirical evidence that 
the private sector is intrinsically more efficient. The same results emerge consistently from sectors 
and services which are subject to outsourcing, such as waste management, and in sectors privatised 
by sale, such as telecoms…… 
 
In the water sector, a stream of empirical studies and reviews provide strong confirmation of the 
view that there is no significant difference in technical efficiency between private and public sector 
operators. These include both international and national studies.  
 
A systematic review in 2008 of the global literature on all aspects of efficiency in water supply 
concluded simply that: “there is no hard evidence which points to a causal relation between 
management ownership and efficiency”.  56  
Another international review, published in 2010, which analysed 27 empirical studies on 
comparative efficiency in water (and waste management) in various countries, concluded that: 
“private production of local services is not systematically less costly than that of public production. 57  
 
A comprehensive study of water supply services in France, where about three - quarters of the 
service is delivered by the private sector through concessions or lease contracts, found that in 2004, 
after making allowance for all other factors, the price of water provided by private companies is 
16.6% higher than in places where municipalities provide the service. 58  
 
A series of studies in the UK has found that there has not been any significant improvement in 
productivity performance since privatisation; a 2007 report concluded that: “after privatization, 
productivity growth did not improve ... average efficiency levels were actually moderately lower in 
2000 than they had been at privatization [in 1989].”  
 
B. Governance and current licensing system 
http://www.dutchwaterauthorities.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Water-Governance-The-
Dutch-Water-Authority-Model1.pdf 
 
Water Act 1973 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6/8-9/42/introduction 
- municipal control of water authorities: s.3 (1), p.6: “ the total number of members appointed by the 
Secretary of State and the Minister is less than the number of those appointed by  local  authorities.”  
Governance of the regional water authorities was by boards of governors. … Over half of the 
members were nominated by local authorities” http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/gbr3563.pdf  
 
Companies hold licenses as appointed undertakers of water and sewerage services: license 
conditions include requirements that the undertakers must be limited companies and are entitled to 
25 years notice of termination.   
 10 
( Water Industry Act 1991 art 6.(5) http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1991/56/part/II; OFWAT: 
Overview of water company licence conditions http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulated-
companies/ofwat-industry-overview/licences/ ; Water firms win 25-year breather on licences 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2769449/Water-firms-win-25-year-breather-on-licences.html ; 
example of Anglian Water http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/lic_lic_ang.pdf . 
Contain standard condition that “ For the purposes of paragraph (c) of Section 7(4) of the Water 
Industry Act 1991, the only  circumstances in which an appointment or variation may be made, in 
relation to the area for  which the Appointee holds the Appointment as water  undertaker  or, as the 
case may  be,  sewerage  undertaker under  this instrument, are where the Secretary of State has 
given the  Appointee at least 25 years' notice to terminate the relevant Appointment in relation to 
the  whole of its area and that period of notice has expired.” (Condition O: Circumstances in which a 
replacement appointment may be made, p.165) 
 
C. Legal rules on compensation –public interest is paramount 
In the UK and the rest of the world, property owners always want as much compensation as possible 
when they lose their property as a result of a political decision. They have often been remarkably 
successful: when slavery was finally abolished in British colonies in 1833, UK slave-owners were paid 
£20million compensation – 40% of total government annual spending at that time – based on the 
actual value of slaves in different colonies.i More recently, company shareholders were 
compensated by UK governments when various sectors were brought into public ownership in the 
20th century.  
 
But there is no simple set formula in UK law for such compensation. In each case, the compensation 
paid has been the result of negotiations between the owners and the government of the day. Even 
the owners are not consistent in their preferred basis for compensation: for example, the 
shareholders of an aircraft company taken over by the government in World War II argued that the 
actual share price was the wrong basis for valuation. So, the actual practice has involved a range of 
different formulae. ii   
 
The UK legal framework for compensation for the former private owners has no connection with the 
stock market rules. It allows parliament to set its own rules in each specific case, taking account of 
public interest considerations, as determined by the democratic process. This principle was 
confirmed in 2012 by the UK Court of Appeal and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), in 
relation to the rescue of Northern Rock in 2008, where the shareholders were awarded zero 
compensation. Some shareholders brought cases arguing that this was unfair, because the share 
price was £0.90, not zero. However, these cases were unsuccessful: the evaluation process used by 
the UK government was validated as entirely legitimate by the High Court, the Court of Appeal iii, 
and, for the same reasons, by the European Court of Human Rights. iv 
 
The Court of Appeal stated: 
“the court would only interfere if it were to conclude that the State's judgment as to what is 
in the public interest is manifestly without reasonable foundation……. if the assumptions 
indeed produce a nil value, that can only be because the business is shown to be worthless 
without the support put in by government” v 
 
The ECHR re-stated the general principle that there was no right to full market value compensation if 
public interest objectives, including social justice and economic reform, lead to a different 
conclusion:  
‘Legitimate objectives in the “public interest”, such as those pursued in measures of 
economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for less 
than reimbursement of the full market value.’ vi  
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This is not a new doctrine. The same principle was used by the English courts and the ECHR over 20 
years previously, in rejecting claims for higher compensation by former shareholders of the 
shipbuilding and aerospace companies in 1977:  
“A decision to enact nationalisation legislation will commonly involve consideration of 
various issues on which opinions within a democratic society may reasonably differ widely…. 
It would, in the Court's view, be artificial in this respect to divorce the decision as to the 
compensation terms from the actual decision to nationalise, since the factors influencing the 
latter will of necessity also influence the former.” (Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom 
(1986) 8 EHRR 329).vii   
 
It was also used to reject a claim by the Duke of Westminster, the largest landowner in Britain, 
against a new law introduced by a Labour government in 1967 allowing leaseholders to buy 
freeholds at much less than the market value. The courts noted that: 
“such legislation had been part of Labour Party policy for some years. It was regarded as a 
necessary social reform, required to right an injustice….”  
  
and again, that, with ownership of property as well as with shares,  
“Legitimate objectives of 'public interest', such as pursued in measures of economic reform 
or measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for less than reimbursement 
of the full market value”. (James and Others v UK [1986] 8 EHRR 123) viii 
 
It is also worth noting that even in the USA, the principles for calculating compensation are not fixed, 
e.g. in Alaska: “Courts have accepted multiple valuation methods in eminent domain proceedings to 
determine just compensation, including fair market value, replacement value, and reproduction 
value.”ix 
 
D. Market values 
Market value estimates for water companies are based on actual LSE market values pro rata for 
proportion of water business by turnover or profit. 
  RCV (m) 
Mkt cap 
m. 
RegWW 
turnover 
m. 
Total 
turnover 
m. 
Implied 
value of 
RegWW 
segment 
Implied 
value as 
% of RCV 
Severn Trent 7829 5184 1506 1787 4369 
 United 
Utilities 10211 6143 1730 1730 6143 
 
Pennon 3150 3403 547 1352 1377 
 
Totals 21190 
   
11889 56% 
Industry (m) 66000 
    
37029 
Source: calculated from London Stock Exchange Dec 2016 data 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/historic/company-files/2016.zip  
 
 
E. Pension funds and investors 
Pension funds own only 3% of shares of UK quoted companies. The majority of shares (54%) are 
owned by foreign investors, with individuals, unit trusts, financial institutions (including banks and 
insurance companies), and other private companies holding over one third (37%). The remainder are 
held by the public sector, trusts, and charities  (ONS Ownership of UK Quoted Shares: 2014 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/investmentspensionsandtrusts/bulletins/ownershipofukquoteds
 12 
hares/2015-09-02  ) .   The percentages of foreign companies or private equity funds held by UK 
pension funds is likely to be even lower.  The concerns over the impact on pension funds could thus 
be dealt with by special provision for any impact on UK pension funds)  
 
 
F. Inflation since 1989 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/datasets/consumerpriceindices  
CPI All Items Index: Estimated pre-97 2015=100: July 1989 52.3, July 2016 100.6: change = +92%.  
 
                                                          
i See Legacies of British Slave-ownership https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/project/context/  
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